I don’t know what you’re taking his follow-up argument to be, but this is a crucial claim in Grossman’s follow-up as I understand it: “A fetus has moral value, but less moral value than a person.”

By construing Marquis as essentially relying on “personhood,” Grossman’s counterargument crucially introduced a continuum on value based on the “measure” of personhood a being possesses.

If we strip Grossman of his ability to couch this in terms of personhood, what does he have? A claim that “a fetus has moral value, but less moral value than a human adult.” But then how does this in any way respond to Marquis’ argument, which a case for taking there to be no moral difference between an adult’s and a fetuses’ “moral value” (to use Grossman’s term)?

Editor in Chief of Arc Digital

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